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NOTES
Conflict of Laws
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-COMMERCIAL PAPER
TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN CODE AND NON-CODE STATES:
A PROBLEM OF APPLICABLE LAW
Introduction
With the development of rapid communications and mass transportation came the
multi-state commercial transactions and the consequent Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, which was drafted to insure the free circulation of negotiable paper. Since
it was eventually adopted by all states, few conflict of laws problems developed in the
area of commercial paper. In an attempt to further simplify, modernize, and permit the
continued expansion of commercial transactions and the law governing them, the Uni-
form Commercial Code was prepared for the consideration of various state legisla-
tures. At the present time it has been enacted in three states,1 and it is expected that
other states will follow this lead.2 However, until there is a truly uniform law, conflict
of laws problems will arise, since the Code differs from the NIL in some respects. Rec-
ognizing this, the formulators of the Code inserted a section which was intended to be
determinative of which state's law should be applied to any particular transaction.3
This section, as originally presented, was the subject of some criticism 4 and was adopted
only by Pennsylvania. It has since been revised, and in this form it has been adopted by
Massachusetts and Kentucky.
It is not the purpose of this Note to indicate all of the innovations which the Code
makes in respect to commercial paper. Rather, a few of the areas in which conflicts
problems may arise will be examined in light of the principles which the courts are
likely to use in resolving them. In order to do this, the problem resulting from a differ-
ence of interpretation under the NIL as to whether a payee may be a holder in due
course will be formulated. Then, the conflict of laws rules which have been utilized in
the past will be discussed as they apply to this problem. Finally, the conflicts provision
of the Code will be compared with common law principles in connection with this
problem and other differences between the substantive provisions of the NIL and the
Code to determine whether, in event the Code is applied, a different result would obtain.
I. Tim PAYEE AS A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
In order to protect the holder in due course from the personal defenses available
against former owners of a negotiable instrument, the NIL declares that he "... . holds
the instrument free from any defect of title of prior parties, and free from defenses
available to prior parties among themselves. .. "5
1 Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 1-101 - 10-104 (1954); Massachusetts, MAss. ANN.
LAws c. 106, §§ 1-101 - 9-507 (Supp. 1958); Kentucky, KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-101 - 10-104
(Supp. 1958).
2 It has been reported that the 1957 edition of the Code will be introduced into the legislatures
of approximately fourteen states in 1959. These states include Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire,
Vermont, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, North Dakota, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah,
and possibly Wyoming. Levy, Current Developments on the Uniform Commercial Code, 63 CoM.
LJ. 322 (1958).
3 UNnWoR COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105. All references are to the 1957 edition of the Code unless
otherwise indicated.
4 See Panel Discussion on the Uniform Commercial Code, Bus. Law., Nov. 1956, p. 49, 68-75;
Smith, Conflicts and Chaos or Contract and Uniformity: The Uniform Commercial Code, 2 KAN. L.
REv. 11 (1953). But see Goodrich, Conflicts Niceties and Commercial Necessities, 1952 Wis. L.
Rnv. 199,
5 UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 57.
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It was well-settled at common law that a payee who took a negotiable instrument
for value and without notice of any defect was a holder in due course despite any per-
sonal defenses the maker might have. 6 Thus, where a maker fraudulently obtained the
signature of an accommodation maker or a co-maker and then transferred the paper to
an innocent payee for value, the co-maker could not plead fraud in an action on the
paper by the payee. 7
A quirk of statutory interpretation by some American courts after the enactment
of the NIL has resulted in some states taking the position that a payee cannot be a
holder in due course.8 This results from a narrow interpretation of sections 191, 52, and
30 of the NIL. A payee can obviously be a "holder" under section 191 which defines a
"holder" as "the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the
bearer thereof." But section 52(4) requires as a condition of one's being a holder
in due course, "that at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any in-
firmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it." This is taken
to mean that there is a positive requirement that the instrument must have been "negoti-
ated" and the divergence of opinion arises in determining whether a payee takes by
"negotiation." In deciding this, all courts turn to section 30, which defines negotiation
as follows: "An instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to an-
other in such a manner as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof." If the nego-
tiable paper were transferred to a payee, he would seem to satisfy this definition, but
the section adds: "If payable to bearer it is negotiated by delivery; if payable to order
it is negotiated by the indorsement of the holder completed by delivery." This latter
sentence of section 30 presumes negotiation by a "holder" of an instrument already
issued since it requires an indorsement of order paper, and the maker or drawer obvi-
ously does not indorse the instrument he initiates.9 Despite this problem of interpreta-
tion, it is generally held that a transfer to a payee is a "negotiation"' 0 and that a payee
may be a holder in due course if he meets the conditions of section 52 of the NIL."
Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk'2 appears to be largely responsible for the minority view
that a payee cannot be a holder in due course.
6 Armstrong v. American Exch. Nat'l Bank, 133 U.S. 433 (1890); Lucas v. Owens, 113 Ind.
521, 16 N.E. 196 (1888); Watson v. Russell, 3 B. & S. 34, 122 Eng. Rep. 14 (Q.B. 1862), aff'd, 5 B. &
S. 968, 122 Eng. Rep. 1090 (Ex. 1864); Poirer v. Morris, 2 El. & B1. 89, 118 Eng. Rep. 702 (Q.B.
1853); Munroe v. Bordier, 8 C.B. 862, 137 Eng. Rep. 747 (C.P. 1849). For a discussion of the
historical development of the problem see Aigler, Payees as Holders ht Due Course, 36 YALE L.J.
608 (1927).
7 Anderson v. Warne, 71 Ill. 20, 22 Am. Rep. 83 (1873); cf. Tischhauser v. Prentice, 30 Cal.
App. 699, 159 Pac. 226 (1916).
8 For a summary of the positions of the various states and a collection of authorities on the
subject, see BEUTEL, BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW 674-91 (7th ed. 1948).
9 This reasoning is discussed and followed in Davis v. National City Bank, 46 Ga. App. 194,
167 S.E. 191 (1932).
10 Drumm Constr. Co. v. Forbes, 305 Ill. 303, 137 N.E. 225 (1922); Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton,
217 Mass. 462, 105 N.E. 605 (1914).
11 Snyder v. McEwen, 148 Tenn. 423, 256 S.W. 434 (1923); Ex parte Goldberg & Lewis, 191
Ala. 356, 67 So. 839 (1914), gives a full discussion of the early English, Canadian, and American
cases. BEUTEL, op. cit. supra note 8, at 674-91 summarizes the positions of the various states.
12 135 Iowa 350, 112 N.W. 807 (1907). This case followed Herdman v. Wheeler, [1902] 1 KB.
361, which held that a payee could not be a holder in due course under the Bills of Exchange Act,
1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61 from which the sections of the NIL in point were taken. But in Lloyd's
Bank, Ltd. v. Cooke, [1907] 1 K.B. 794, a contrary result was reached on the grounds of estoppel.
Herdman v. Wheeler was considered and distinguished. In a concurring opinion of the Lloyd's Bank
case, [1907] 1 K.B. 794, 808, it was reasoned that a payee may take by negotiation and therefore be
a holder in due course. The argument advanced was that according to the act, "a bill is negotiated
when it is transferred from one person to another in such manner as to constitute the transferee
the holder of the bill," and that if the word "holder" were replaced by its definition in the act: "the
payee or indorsee who is in possession of the bill," it would be clear that the issuance of a bill to a
payee would be a "negotiation" within the meaning of the act. This same type of reasoning is used
and enlarged in BEUTEL, op. cit. supra note 8, at 675-76.
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Since negotiable paper is often delivered to an intermediary conditionally or for a
particular purpose, the additional question arises as to whether the payee takes subject
to the conditional limitation. Section 16 of the NIL provides: "As between immediate
parties... the delivery... may be shown to have been conditional or for a special pur-
pose only ... But where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a
valid delivery thereof ... is conclusively presumed." The argument that a payee -is an
"immediate" party within the meaning of this section is rejected in those jurisdictions
where a payee is regarded as a holder in due course under sections 191, 52, and 30.13
It is not necessary for the purposes of this Note to consider the merits of these
arguments. 14 It is sufficient to note that a split of authority exists. In contradistinction,
the Code leaves no room for such a basic difference of interpretation, for it expressly
adopts the position that a payee may be a holder in due course to the same extent and
under the same circumstances as any other holder, whether he takes the instrument by
purchase from a third person or directly from the obligor.' 5 Thus, the Code adopts the
majority rule concerning the status of a bona fide payee for value, and although there
was a possible area in which a conflict of laws situation could arise by virtue of diverse
interpretations of the NIL, the conflict is likely to become more intensified as more
states adopt the Code.
In determining the question of which state's law will govern the payee's position,
courts operating within the scope of the NIL have a variety of general legal principles
available as aids in resolving this problem wrought by a difference in statutory inter-
pretation. Since the NIL makes no provision for conflict of laws problems, general con-
tract principles as to what law governs are applicable.' 6 These tests will be examined and
applied to the problem of M, the maker, who fraudulently induces CM to sign a note
as co-maker in a state following the minority rule that a payee cannot be a holder in due
course, and who then mails it to P, the payee, who takes it in good faith for value, and
who resides in a state which follows the majority rule. P then institutes suit against the
co-maker to recover on the note.
II. CONFLICT OF LAws PRINcIPLEs AND THim APPLICATION AT COMMON LAW
A. Place of Contracting
In the contract field it is frequently necessary to determine where the contract was
made, since the solution of many conflict problems depends upon the place of con-
tracting. The forum determines this place in accordance with its own conflict of laws
rules.' 7 It is generally said to be the state in which the last act necessary to make a bind-
ing contract takes place.' 8 Where a negotiable instrument is involved, the decisive ques-
tion is the determination of the place where it was executed and delivered, because the
NIL requires delivery of such an instrument for it to be effective.' 9 The place of de-
livery may be other than the place of signing.20 For example, when a bill or note is
drawn and signed in one jurisdiction and mailed from there to the payee in another
jurisdiction at the request of the payee, it is deemed to be executed at the place of
13 Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton, 217 Mass. 462, 105 N.E. 605 (1914).
14 There has been a wealth of material written on this problem. Most authorities agree that the
better view is that a payee may be holder in due course, although no categorical answer is possible
without considering the particular facts. See generally, Aigler, supra note 6; Britton, The Payee as
a Holder in Due Course, 1 U. CHI. L. REv. 728 (1934).
15 UNwoiuR CoMMERCaL CODE § 3-302(2) and comments thereto.
10 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Fidelity-Baltimore Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 212 Md. 506,
129 A.2d 815 (1957); Houston v. Keith, 100 Miss. 83, 56 So. 336 (1911); Garrigue v. Keller, 164 Ind.
676, 74 N.E. 523 (1905).
17 Illinois Fuel Co. v. Mobile & Ohio R.R., 319 Mo. 899, 8 S.W.2d 834, cert. denied, 278 U.S.
640 (1928); RESTATEMENT, CoNFLiCT op LAws § 311 (1934).
18 Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, 198 U.S. 508 (1905); Smith v. Onyx Oil & Chem. Co., 218
F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1955); Aruthur A. Bishop & Co. v. Thompson, 99 Vt. 17, 130 Ad. 701 (1925).
19 UNIFORm NEGOTIABLE INsTRuMmrs LAw § 16.
20 Tilden v. Blair, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 241 (1874); Kiess v. Baldwin, 74 F.2d 470 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
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mailing if the delivery to the post office completes the contract between the maker and
the payee.2 ' The payee's request to use the mail may be implied,2 2 but if there is no
such request expressed or implied, the instrument is not delivered until received.23 If
the note were signed in one state and physically delivered to the payee in another state,
the contract is considered to have been made in the latter jurisdiction.2 4
It is generally stated that the nature, validity, obligation, legal incidents, construc-
tion, interpretation, and contractual rights are governed by the law of the place of con-
tracting.2 5 The question of whether a person is a holder in due course involves contrac-
tual rights and obligations and does not relate merely to the remedy. Therefore, the
rights of the parties to a bill or note and the incidents of the consequent obligation are
often said to be governed by the law of the place where it was executed and delivered. 26
Under this conflicts test the payee's position, in the example given, will depend on
where the contract was completed by delivery. If it was "made" where it was mailed,
the payee will not be considered a holder in due course. But if there were no request, ex-
pressed or implied, to use the mail by the payee, the contract would be considered
"made" where it was received, and the payee could be a holder in due course, since it
is assumed that the latter jurisdiction follows the majority rule.
B. Place of Performance
If the instrument states a place of performance which differs from the place of
making, the problem becomes more involved. It is presumed that the parties contracted
in reference to the place of payment, and many courts will say that the lex loci solutionis
governs without considering where the instrument was made, signed, dated or de-
livered.2 7 This is done in order to give effect to the presumed intention of the parties.2 8
The rationale appears to be that the statement of where performance is to take place
is a clearer indication of the parties' intent as to what law shall govern than the place of
contracting. However, it is sometimes stated that the law of the place of performance
21 Burr v. Beckler, 264 MI1. 230, 106 N.E. 206 (1914); Barrett v. Dodge, 16 R.I. 740, 19 Adt. 530
(1890).
22 In re Lucas' Estate, 272 Mich. 1, 261 N.W. 117 (1935).
23 Freeland v. Carmouche, 177 La. 395, 148 So. 658 (1933). If the efficacy of the instrument is
contingent upon its acceptance by the payee, it is executed where it is received and accepted. Navajo
County Bank v. Doslon, 163 Cal. 485, 126 Pac. 153 (1912). In the case of a renewal note, the de-
livery to the payee is conditional until the original note is given back to the maker. Therefore, the
place of making a renewal note is where the payee receives it and returns or mails the original
note to the maker. Staples v. Nott, 128 N.Y. 403, 28 N.E. 515 (1891); Bell v. Packard, 69 Me. 105,
31 Am. Rep. 251 (1879); RESTATEMENr CONFLTxr OF LAWS § 313 (1934). Contra, Douglas County
State Bank v. Sutherland, 52 N.D. 617, 204 N.W. 683 (1925).
24 Kiess v. Baldwin, 74 F.2d 470 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Thompson v. Taylor, 66 N.J.L. 253, 49 At].
544 (1901).
25 Keehn v. Rogers, 311 Mich. 416, 18 N.W.2d 877 (1945); Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows
Co., 58 R.I. 162, 192 At. 158 (1937); Lars v. F.H. Smith Co., 36 Del. 477, 178 At. 651 (1935);
RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934). On the question of where the contract was entered
into, the intention of the parties prevails. It may be found in the nature of the transaction, the sub-
ject matter of the contract, or surrounding facts and circumstances. Philip Carey Co. v. Maryland
Cas. Co. 201 Iowa 1063, 206 N.W. 808 (1926). See also, 2 BE.ALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1171-74 (1935).
26 C ral Gables, Inc. v. Christopher, 108 Vt. 414, 189 At. 147 (1937); Ellis v. Crowe, 193 Ark.
255, 99 S.W.2d 568 (1936); Alropa Corp. v. King's Estate, 279 Mich. 418, 272 N.W. 728 (1937).
Goodrich states that this method of determining the legal consequences of an act by the rules of
law in force where it is done is the natural way of settling problems under the common law. He also
points out that this test has the practical advantage of certainty, a desirable attribute especially in
commercial matters, which allows a lawyer to advise a client with reference to the law which will
be used if the contract is involved in litigation, and, more important, it allows him to assist in draw-
ing up agreements which will not become involved in litigation. GooDRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 322
(3d ed. 1949).
27 Sterret v. Stoddard Lumber Co., 150 Ore. 491, 46 P.2d 1023 (1935); Commercial Credit Corp.
v. Boyko, 103 NJ.L. 620, 137 At. 534 (1927); Walling v. Cushman, 28 Mass. 62, 130 N.E. 175
(1921); Pratt v. Dittmer, 51 Cal. App. 512, 197 Pac. 365 (1921).
28 Hall v. Cordell, 142 U.S. 116 (1891); Reigbley v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
390 Ill. 242, 61 N.E.2d 29 (1945); Edgington v. Edgington, 179 Tenn. 83, 162 S.W.2d 1082 (1942).
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should be applied only to matters relating to performance. 29 If no place of performance
is stated, it is presumed that the parties contemplated the law of the place where the
instrument was made.30
Thus, if the note in the example being used states that it is to be paid at the place
of business of P, the payee, which is in a state following the majority rule, he could
be a holder in due course. If no place of performance were mentioned, the place-of-
contracting rule discussed above would be used.
C. Intention of the Parties
A third theory which has been used in the task of selecting what law is to apply
holds that the law which the parties intended or may fairly be presumed to have in-
tended shall govern. 31 Thus, if it is clear that the parties intended the contract to be
governed by the law of the place where it was made or some other place, or if the
parties stipulate in good faith that the law of another state shall govern, such law is de-
terminative, and the lex loci solutionis does not apply.3 2 In the absence of an express
stipulation that the law of a particular jurisdiction is to govern, the tests of place of
contracting and place of performance are often used by the courts as indicative of the
intention of the parties. That is, the circumstances surrounding the transaction are ex-
amined, and, in the absence of factors indicating a different intent, the courts presume
that the law of the place of contracting or of the place of performance, if stated, is the
law with a view to which the contract was made.3 3 Of course, the intermingling of these
tests leads to some confusion and to difficulties in reconciling the decisions. As Goodrich
points out:
Frequently it will be said that the law of the place of performance is presumably that
intended by the parties, so it is sometimes hard to tell whether a court is applying the
law of the place of performance because this law is supposed to be the one which
governs or because the parties are supposed to have intended it.34
The intention rule has been the subject of criticism,3 5 and the Restatement favors
the place-of-contracting theory except for matters relating to performance. 36 Some
29 Seudder v. Union Nat'l Bank, 91 U.S. 406 (1875); In re American Fuel & Power Co., 151 F.2d
470 (6th Cir. 1945), af'd sub nom. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156
(1946); RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 332, comment c, and 358 (1934). Goodrich suggests
that referring the validity of a contract to the place of performance involves looking to some law
other than the place where the acts are done to determine their legal effect, and that the logical
analogies support the place of making rather than the place of performance. While admitting that
the place-of-performance rule could be adopted for considerations of commercial convenience or
others, he believes that no such considerations are apparent. Bernstein v. Lipper Mfg. Co., 307 Pa.
36, 160 Ad. 770 (1932) uses Goodrich's reasoning that the weakness of the place-of-performance rule
is shown when performance is to take place in more than one state. In such a case, "there seems
nothing left but to apply the local contract rules of the lex loci contractus, unless the question of
validity is to be chopped up into as many pieces as there are different places for performance."
GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 26, at 325.
30 Folsom v. Continental Adjustment Corp., 48 Ga. App. 435, 172 S.E. 833 (1934).
31 Shotwell v. Dairymen's League Coop. Ass'n, 22 NJ. Misc. 171, 37 A.2d 420 (1944); Mayer v.
Roche, 77 N.J.L. 681, 75 At. 235 (1909).
32 Sterret v. Stoddard Lumber Co., 150 Ore. 491, 46 P.2d 1023 (1935); United Bank & Trust Co.
v. McClough, 115 Neb. 327, 212 N.W. 762 (1927); Philip Carey Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 201
Iowa 1063, 206 N.W. 808 (1926); Pollak v. Danbury Mfg. Co., 103 Conn. 553, 131 At. 426 (1925).
33 See, e.g., Gaston, Williams & Wigmore of Canada, Ltd. v. Warner, 260 U.S. 201 (1922);
Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882); United States-Alaska Packing Co. v. Uketa, 58 F.2d 944
(1932); Garrigue v. Keller, 164 Ind. 676, 74 N.E. 523 (1905); Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co., 150 N.Y.
314, 44 N.E. 959 (1896). In Green v. Northwestern Trust Co., 128 Minn. 30, 150 N.W. 229 (1914),
it is stated that the presumed intention of the parties that the law of a particular state shall be
governing will be given effect only when that state has a vital connection with the transaction or
where the elements of the contract important in determining the governing law have their situs in
such state.
34 GoonRIcH, op. cit. supra note 26, at 330.
35 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 25, at 1079-86. GoonDicH, op. cit. supra note 26, at 326-27.
Green v. Northwestern Co., 128 Minn. 30, 150 N.W. 229 (1899), and Grand v. Livingston, 4 App.
Div. 589, 98 N.Y. Supp. 490 (1896), point out that the parties do not usually consider what law
will govern their contract before they enter into it.
36 REsTATLMENT, CoNwLacr OF LAws §§ 332, 358 (1934).
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courts have decided that neither the place of making nor the place of performance is
conclusive as to the law which the parties intended or may fairly be presumed to have
intended, but that both are important indicia to be considered, along with other relevant
circumstances. 37
If the note in the assumed problem provided that the law of the state in which the
maker resided would govern, this test would give it effect, notwithstanding the fact that
it was payable in the payee's jurisdiction. Since we assumed that the maker and co-
maker resided in a state following the minority rule, the payee would be subject to
any of the personal defenses which the co-maker may have against him.
D. Grouping of Contacts
This test is somewhat newer than the others, and it is perhaps the logical extension
of the "intention" test. It is variously known as the "center of gravity" or "grouping
of contacts" theory of the conflict of laws. Rather than making what generally amounts
to a calculated guess in determining which law the parties apparently intended to con-
trol their rights and obligations, the court determines which law the parties "should"
have intended. Consequently, emphasis is placed upon the law of the jurisdiction "which
has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute." 38 This theory was originally
formulated in W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes3 9 as follows: "The court will consider all
acts of the parties touching the transaction in relation to the several states involved and
will apply as the law governing the transaction the law of that state with which the
facts are in most intimate contact." In applying this test, the court said:
Looking for the contact points in the present case we observe first that the parties
were at all times engaged in purely business transactions. They transacted this business
almost exclusively in Illinois. The accumulated indebtedness . . . arose solely from
Illinois transactions. The place of their conferences to arrive at a settlement was in
Illinois. The note was payable in Illinois. It was on an Illinois form. It was prepared in
Illinois. It was valid in that state and was there to be performed. It was actually intended
that Illinois law control, as expressly found by the court. On the other hand the only
contact points with Indiana were the residence of the debtors, their signing of the note
in Indiana and their placing it in the mall in Indiana. Considering all these circum-
stances it is impossible to escape the conclusions that the transaction centered in the
State of Illinois and that its law should be applied to the note .... 40
This theory was used in the New York case of Auten v. Auten4 ' in determining
the applicable law in matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation, validity, and
performance of a contract. Reference was made to the Barber case and Rubin v. Irving
Trust Co.42 as resorting to this method to rationalize the results reached by the courts
in decided cases. In Global Commerce Corp. v. Clark-Babbitt Industries, Inc.43 the
Second Circuit cited Auten v. Auten as explicity accepting ". .. what was apparently
an already existing change in the earlier doctrine that the validity of a contract depends
on the law of the place where the parties make their agreement." 44 The federal court
went on to say:
We must accept the substituted concept as authoritative; and, so far as we can gather,
the test appears to be (1) what is the "center of gravity" of the facts, or (2) which jur-
37 Joffe v. Bonne, 14 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1926); Mayer v. Roche, 77 N.J.L. 681, 75 At. 235 (1909);
Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co., 150 N.Y. 314, 44 N.E. 959 (1896).
38 Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 113 N.E.2d 424, 431 (1953). See also, Jensen v.
Swedish Am. Line, 185 F.2d 212 (1st Cir. 1950); Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws:
Reflections on Reading Professor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155, 1161-68 (1947).
39 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423 (1945). Although this case is generally given credit for
being the first case to base its decision on this theory, the earlier case of Jones v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 158 Misc. 466, 286 N.Y. Supp. 4 (1936) discusses it along with the other theories in deter-
mining the applicable law.
40 W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, supra note 39, at 423-24. This rule was immediately followed
in Spahr v. P. & H. Supply Co., 233 Ind. 592, 63 N.E.2d 425 (1945).
41 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
42 305 N.Y. 288, 113 N.E.2d 424 (1953).
43 239 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1956).
44 239 F.2d at 719.
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isdiction "has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute," or (3) which
is "most intimately concerned with the outcome of [the] particular litigation," or (4)
"whether one rule or the other produces the best practical results." 4 5
In the example under consideration-that is, where the payee is suing a co-maker
whose signature was procured by fraud-assume that the note was found to be made in
the minority state because the contract was completed there by placing it in the mail
at the request of the payee and that it was to be performed in the majority state because
it was payable there. Assume further that the note is in payment of a debt which arose
out of various contracts of sale, all of which were made in the majority state, and that
the goods contracted for were all delivered in that state for use there. Under this test,
the significant contacts are emphasized instead of regarding the parties' intention or the
place of making or performance as conclusive. 46 Therefore, it seems likely that the
court would find that the majority state had the greatest interest in the outcome and
apply its law; it follows that the payee's position as a bona fide holder for value would
be protected.
III. SECTION 1-105-A DIFFERENCE IN RESULT
In opposition to the NIL, the Code expressly sets out a provision as to its territorial
application:
[W]hen a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state
or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or
nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this Act applies
to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.47
This "appropriate relation" test appears at first glance to be similar to the "grouping
of contacts" test. This is not necessarily so, however, as a court could find that the
place of making or performance, or the parties' intention was an "appropriate relation."
If suit is brought in a state operating under the Code, the Code is applied only
when the forum finds an "appropriate relation" with the Code state. If the court finds
no such relation, it would then fall back on common law conflicts principles to de-
termine which state law is applicable. Thus, the adoption of the Code by a state would
not vary the rules formerly used to determine applicable law as long as no "appropriate
relation" were found between the total transaction and the Code state wherein the action
was commenced. A possible difference could easily arise if an "appropriate relation"
were found. For instance, a state, prior to adoption of the Code, might have followed
the rule that the law to be applied in a negotiable instruments conflict problem was de-
termined by the place of making. In the example previously used of the makers mailing
a note from a minority-rule state at the request of the payee, the contract would be
considered "made" in that state and, consequently, the court, in applying that state's
law, would hold that a payee could not be a holder in due course. However, with the
adoption of the Code, the same court would apply the "appropriate relation" test, and
the forum might well decide that the place of making in the minority-rule state would not
be determinative because there was an "appropriate relation" with the Code state. If
suit were brought in a majority rule state, that state might have to apply the minority
rule by virtue of its conflicts rules, and, therefore, a result different from the determina-
tion of the Code state, under the same circumstances, might obtain. Thus, under the
Code it would be easier for the court to find that the payee could be a holder in due
course since it would not be bound by the more rigid general rules such as the place
of making. What constitutes an "appropriate relation" is left entirely to the discretion of
the courts, and much depends on how far Code courts will go in finding appropriate re-
lations, and establishing a policy of either extensive or narrow Code application. 48
45 239 F.2d at 719.
46 Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101-02 (1954).
47 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105(1).
48 What this judicial policy will be is difficult to predict. Certainly, much will depend upon the
type of state that adopts the Code--commercial, industrial or agricultural. However, it seems that
if a state legislature sees fit to enact the Code, the state courts should, within constitutional limita-
tions, apply the Code in every available situation so as to best give significance to what is apparently
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IV. THE SCOPE OF COVERAGE
Initially, before discussing the substantive innovations, it will be helpful to de-
termine if there is any appreciable difference in the commercial area encompassed by
the NIL and the Code respectively. Should there be such a difference this, in itself, would
give rise to conflicts of laws, and would be resolved by a judicial implementation of the
conflicts rules discussed above.
A. Scope of the NIL
Section 1 of the NIL states, "An instrument to be negotiable must conform to the
following requirements .... -49 (Emphasis added.) These prerequisites of negotiability,
as set out in the first nine sections of the NIL, have given rise to conflicting interpreta-
tions as to the necessity of strict application and enforcement of section 1. Britton in-
terprets this provision as demanding strict compliance if there is to be negotiability, 50
and contends that this has been an important factor in achieving the comparative uni-
formity which is now found in our commercial law. Beutel, to the contrary, is of the
opinion that the language of section 1 is not mandatory. 51 Without arguing the merits
of either view, it is clear that the confusion has carried into the courts and led to in-
consistent results. It has led courts, in some instances, to refuse limited negotiability to
order instruments dealt with on the investment market, 52 while other courts have up-
held the negotiability of instruments which were actually conditional sales contracts
thinly disguised as promissory notes. 53
Under the NIL, a minority of courts has evolved a doctrine of "negotiability by
contract," holding that the parties to a commercial instrument that does not conform
to the formal requisites for negotiable paper may impart to it all or some of the incidents
of negotiability by an agreement in the contract to that effect. 54 Others have recognized
the doctrine in dictum.5 5 In Aaron v. Mango,50 a Wisconsin court in effect applied a
doctrine of negotiability by contract to a bond which, though conditioned on promises
to repair and pay taxes, contained a provision describing the rights of a holder in due
course. The provision stated:
No purchasers before maturity of any of said bonds shall, as to the lien which this
Indenture purports to effect, be affected, unless he have actual knowledge thereof, by
any equities that might at any time exist between the Mortgagors and the Trustees
or between the Mortgagors or the Trustees and any previous holder or owner of such
bond or bonds.57
The court held that because of this provision the bonds, in the hands of an innocent
purchaser, were not subject to a defense of partial failure of consideration, even though
the bonds were otherwise non-negotiable.
the will of the people. If the Code states were not to apply the Code whenever possible, why was §
1-105 included at all? And see comment 3, following § 1-105: "In deciding [what relation is ap-
propriate], the court is not strictly bound by precedents established in other contexts."
49 UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 1.
50 Britton, Formal Requisites of Negotiability-The Negotiable Instruments Law Compared
with the Proposed Commercial Code, 26 RocKY Mr. L. Rav. 1 (1954).
51 Beutel, Negotiability by Contract, 28 ILL. L. Rev. 205 (1933).
52 Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926) (interim certificates); King
Cattle Co. v. Joseph, 158 Minn. 481, 198 N.W. 798 (1924) (corporate bonds); Manker v. American
Savings Bank & Trust Co., 131 Wash. 430, 230 Pac. 406 (1924) (municipal bonds). In all these
cases the rights of a subsequent bona fide purchaser were defeated because the instrument did not
meet the requirements of the NIL.
53 Conditional sales contracts are usually held to be non-negotiable because they promise no
sum certain. For an illustration of such an agreement successfully incorporated into a promissory
note without destroying negotiability, see Abingdon Bank & Trust Co. v. Shipplett-Moloney Co., 316
Ill. App. 79, 43 N.E.2d 857 (1942). Contra, Fleming v. Sherwood, 24 N.D. 144, 139 N.W. 101 (1912).
54 Morgan Bros. v. Dayton Coal & Iron Co., 134 Tenn. 228, 183 S.W. 1019 (1916); see Note,
Negotiability By Contract, Estoppel or Usage, 25 COLUM. L. Rlv. 209 (1925).
55 Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594, 598, (1926); see also Enoch v.
Brandon, 249 N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45, 46 (1928).
56 207 Wis. 583, 242 N.W. 138 (1932).
57 Id. at 140.
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We perceive no reason for holding that the provision above recited was not con-
tractual or not fully binding upon the defendants. We do not see how its validity or
legality as a contract can be questioned, nor do we perceive any ground of public
policy of the state of Illinois which prevents our giving it full force and effect.58
Utah has also adopted a doctrine of promissory negotiability. In Anglo-California
Trust Co. v. Hall59 the court held that in the absence of fraud the purchaser in a con-
ditional sales agreement could, by contract, waive the defenses on a non-negotiable in-
strument, the defense in this instance being a breach of warranty. No authorities were
cited by the court to sustain its position. The contract provision in the controversy
stipulated:
[I]n the event the seller shall assign and transfer this agreement .... then the
purchaser shall be precluded from in any manner attacking the validity of this agree-
ment on the grounds of fraud, duress, mistake, want of consideration, or upon any other
ground, and the moneys payable hereunder by the purchaser shall be paid to such as-
signee or holder without recoupment, set-off, or counter-claim of any sort whatsoever.6O
Some jurisdictions have expressly rejected the theory of negotiability by contract. 61
Others, meanwhile, have abstained from an obiter expression on this issue, 62 distinguish-
ing the Hall case on the ground that the defense there was not based on fraud or failure
of consideration, and deciding that it would be contrary to public policy to waive such
a defense.
In the cases discussed where negotiation by contract was allowed, the court did not
confer upon the non-conforming instruments all the attributes of negotiability, such
as the presumption of consideration and value. They merely gave effect to provisions
waiving defenses and equities and this vested the bona fide purchasers of the paper
with the rights of holders in due course.8 3
B. Scope of the Code
Article three of the Code, by the terms of section 3-103, does not apply to money,
documents of title, or investment securities. Additionally, section 3-104 provides that
"Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must. . . ." (Emphasis
added.) It goes on to make it clear that the article applies only to commercial paper by
specifying the four types of commercial paper covered. The comment following section
3-104 interprets the words "within the Article" as leaving open "the possibility that some
writings may be made negotiable by other statutes or by judicial decision." However,
the comment goes on to explain that an instrument cannot be made negotiable within
the article by contract or by conduct. It is within the discretion of the court to arrive
at a result similar to that of negotiability by finding that the obligor is estopped by his
conduct from asserting a defense against a bona fide purchaser. Such an estoppel would
depend upon the ordinary principles of contract law and not upon any extension of the
accepted concept of negotiability. 64 From this it would appear that the Code will not
allow its provisions to be applied by contract to non-conforming instruments in any sit-
uation, regardless of the equities of the case. Since under the NIL this could be done as
illustrated in the cases discussed above, we have a situation which, until the Code be-
comes a truly uniform law among the states, could prove a fertile pasture for the
growth of conflicts problems.
C. Resolution of the Problem-A Basic Conflict
The solutions offered by the NIL and the Code to resolve these conflicts also
differ. Since the NIL contains no provision dealing with the problem of conflicts, resort
58 Id. at 141.
59 61 Utah 227, 211 Pac. 991 (1922).
00 Id. at 992.
61 American Nat'l Bank v. Sommerville, 191 Cal. 364, 216 Pac. 376 (1923).
62 Pacific Acceptance Corp. v. Whalen, 43 Idaho 15, 248 Pac. 444 (1926). Contra, Howie v.
Lewis, 14 Pa. Super. 232, 240 (1900), holding that a defense of fraud could be waived.
03 Howie v. Lewis, supra note 62.
64 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-104 and comments.
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is had to common law rules and principles which the various states have formulated
over a period of years. In determining negotiability, the courts have generally used one
of four tests, all of which have been fully discussed earlier in the Note: place of exe-
cution, (lex loci contractus),65 place of performance (lex loci solutionis),66 intention
of the parties67 and "grouping of contacts."68 All of these tests apparently seek to give
life to that law which the parties contemplated at the time of the transaction. The Code,
on the other hand, both in the original draft as enacted by Pennsylvania and in the
revised draft as adopted by Kentucky and Massachusetts, contains a provision on the
applicability of the Code. The Pennsylvania statute provides: 69
(3) The Articles on Commercial Paper (Article Three) and Bank Deposits and
collections (Article Four) apply whenever any contract or transaction within the
terms of either of the Articles is made or occurs after the effective date of this Act
and the contract (a) is made, offered or accepted or the transaction occurs within this
state; or (b) is to be performed or completed wholly or in part within this state;
or (c) involves commercial paper which is made, drawn, or transferred within this state.
A number of authorities felt this provision to be too harsh, 70 and it was subse-
quently revised to allow the application of the Code only when the transaction bears
an "appropriate relation" to the Code state. 71 The original provision was further quali-
fied to the extent that when the transaction bears a reasonable relationship to the state
in which the Code is in effect and also to another state, the parties may stipulate which
law is to govern. In the absence of such stipulation the Code applies. 72
When the aforementioned rules are applied to the conflicts problems arising out
of the restricted scope of the Code, a lack of uniformity is found in the result achieved.
For the purpose of this Note, let us assume that A, in Utah executes and delivers to B
commercial paper that does not conform to the requirements of the NIL. This instru-
ment contains an agreement whereby A agrees not to assert any defense against a sub-
sequent holder or assignee, which is the type of agreement upheld in Anglo-California
Trust Co. v. Hall7 3 and which Beutel contends is permitted under the NIL. Let us
further assume that the instrument states it is to be performed in Utah and concerns
a transaction in Utah. B takes the instrument into Michigan where he transfers it to
C, who takes for value and without notice of any defect in the instrument. Subsequently
there is a breach of warranty by B, and A attempts to raise this as a defense in an action
brought by C in Michigan. A fair conclusion would be that regardless of which state
operating under the NIL the action is brought in, the courts would look to the law of
Utah to determine whether or not the paper was negotiable, and so preclude the use
of personal defenses against C, a holder in due course.74 It was in that state that the
instrument was executed and delivered; it is certainly a fair assumption that the parties
contemplated Utah law at the time of the transaction; and there are no reasonable con-
tacts with another state which would warrant the application of its law. If the same
paper were passed into Kentucky or Massachusetts, both of which opdrate under the
65 Alropa Corp. v. King's Estate, 279 Mich. 418, 272 N.W. 728 (1937).
66 Jefferis v. Kanawha Fuel Co., 182 Wis. 203, 196 N.W. 238 (1923); Walling v. Cushman, 238
Mass. 62, 130 N.E. 175 (1921).
67 Mayer v. Roche, 77 N.J.L. 681, 75 Atl. 235 (1909).
68 W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945).
69 PA. STAT. ANN. it. 12A, § 1-105 (1954).
70 See Panel Discussion On The Uniform Commercial Code, Bus. Law, Nov. 1956, p. 49, 68-75;
Smith, Conflicts and Chaos or Contract and Uniformity: The Uniform Commercial Code, 2 KAN.
L. REv. 11 (1953).
71 UNIFORM COMMERCUL CODE § 1-105.
72 Ibid. It also states in the comments to this section "... an agreement as to choice of law
may sometimes take effect as a shorthand expression of the intent of the parties as to matters
governed by their agreement, even though the transaction has no significant contact with the juris-
diction chosen." The real meaning of this provision is hazy and could well lead to difficult problems
of interpretation.
73 61 Utah 227, 211 Pac. 991 (1922).
74 Ellis v. Crowe, 193 Ark. 255, 99 S.W.2d 568 (1936); Stevens v. Gaude, 9 La. App. 664, 120
So. 79 (1928). A more complete discussion of this is provided in an earlier part of the Note, pp.
211-13 supra.
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Code, there appears to be no reason to anticipate a different result. These states would be
justified in applying the Code only if the transaction bears an "appropriate relation"
to the state, 75 which seemingly does not exist in our example. This would not seem open
to argument, since under the original draft, as enacted by Pennsylvania, the act of
transferring an instrument within the state was the least contact with the state which
would demand the application of the Code; therefore, if the revision actually curtailed
to any extent the scope of the original section 1-105, it would not allow the mere
transfer of an instrument to be an appropriate relation. Also, the identical situation is
dealt with in the comments to the revised section 1-105, wherein it is stated that there
is not an appropriate relation when the parties have clearly contracted on the basis of
some other law, "as where the law of the place of contracting and the law of the place
of contemplated performance are the same and are contrary to the law under the
Code." Therefore the Code would not be applied, and by common law these states
would look to Utah for determination. 76 However, were the instrument negotiated
to C in Pennsylvania, and the action instituted there the Code expressly states that it
be applied.77 In such event, C's interest would be destroyed for the Code treats such an
instrument as non-negotiable, and this seems contrary to the intent of the parties at the
time of the transactions.
To develop this further, let us change our hypothetical situation. Let us now assume
that A, a buyer, in payment for goods sold to him by B, executes and delivers to B in
Pennsylvania a conditional sales contract. wherein he waives all defenses. This agree-
ment is to be performed in Mississippi and evolves out of a transaction in Kentucky.
This is in turn transferred by B to C, in another state, who, when he attempts to re-
cover as a holder in due course, is met with the defense of breach of warranty. Within
the courts operating under the NIL, there might well be achieved a difference of result.
When the place of payment is stated in the instrument, courts generally recognize the
law of that jurisdiction as the law which the contracting parties contemplated as con-
trolling.7 8 In such courts the negotiability would in all probability be determined by
the law of Mississippi. The issue of negotiability of a conditional sales contract has not
been presented to the Mississippi courts, but in light of the decision in Alder v. Inter-
state Trust & Banking Co.7 9 there is a strong probability that the note would be declared
negotiable. However, were the action brought in New York80 or Indiana,81 where the
test is that of "grouping of contacts," there is a possibility that the court would find suf-
ficient contacts with Kentucky, that being the situs of the transaction, to warrant apply-
ing the Code, and thus require a declaration of non-negotiability. Again, if the action
were brought in either Massachusetts or Kentucky it appears that the result would be
no different from that reached by some courts under the NIL. It would fall to the Ken-
tucky court to determine if there exists an appropriate relation with the state. It appears
likely from the comments following section 1-105 that such an appropriate relation
would clearly be present in the hypothetical situation posed. If so, the Code would be
applied and C's interest destroyed. If no such relationship is found, the Kentucky and
Massachusetts courts would revert to the common law and look to Mississippi for ad-
judication.8 2 Pennsylvania, regardless of the implied intent of the parties and common
75 A more complete discussion of the "appropriate relation" test is provided in p. 215, supra.
76 Deins' Adm'r v. Gibbs 257 Ky. 469, 78 S.W.2d 346 (1935); Walling v. Cushman, 238 Mass.
62, 130 N.E. 175 (1921).
77 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22A, § 1-105 (1945), "... involves commercial paper which is . . .
transferred ... "
78 Carson Nat'l Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 225 Mo. App. 948, 34 S.W.2d 143 (1931); Com-
mercial Credit Corp. v. Boyko, 103 N.J.L. 620, 137 At. 534 (1927).
79 166 Miss. 215, 146 So. 107 (1933). This case concerned a waiver clause that was not in the
note itself, but in the trust deed given as security for it. It was held to be negotiable.
80 Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
81 W. H. Barber v. Hughes, 233 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945).
82 Under the rule of Deins' Adm'r v. Gibbs, 257 Ky. 469, 78 S.W.2d 346 (1935) and Banca
Italiana Di Sconto v. Columbia Counter Co., 252 Mass. 552, 148 N.E. 105 (1925), both Kentucky
and Massachusetts look to the law of the place of performance to resolve such conflicts.
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law rules to the contrary, would apply the Code simply because the instrument was
executed there.
This analysis presents an interesting situation which deserves consideration. If the
action is brought in a non-Code state, whose substantive law adheres to the general view
that there can be no negotiability in the situation discussed, under the general rule of
conflicts such a state will still give effect to the minority position that negotiability can
be created by contract. This is so in a Code state only if there is no "appropriate rela-
tion." What contacts will be deemed "appropriate" has not been definitively stated.
However, the revised section 1-105 seemingly allows a court in a Code state great
latitude in finding such an appropriate relation so that it might avoid giving effect to
the view that there can be negotiability by contract. Such a practice would greatly aid
the expansion of the Code since it would cause the Code to be applied in situations
which at common law could be governed by the law of another state, even though it
is substantially different from the law of the jurisdiction wherein the action is brought.
V. INNOVATIONS IN THE FORMAL REQUISITES OF NEGOTIABILITY
In addition to this possible variance in scope of application, there are several sub-
stantive innovations in the Code as regards formal requisites of negotiability. Under the
NIL an instrument, to be negotiable, must conform to the requirement, inter alia, that
it contain an order to pay a sum certain in money.83 The application of this term in de-
ciding individual cases has produced a variety or results. There are some decisions to
the effect that a provision in the instrument providing for a discount upon payment at
or before maturity does not affect its negotiability.8 4 Other courts have taken the view
that such a provision renders the note non-negotiable due to its uncertainty of amount
payable.85 The drafters of the Code have removed any doubts on the point. Code sec-
tion 3-106 states that the sum payable is a sum certain even though it is payable with
a stated discount or addition if paid before or after the date fixed for payment; the test
for certainty being computability from the instrument itself at the time of payment.
Still another formality required of a negotiable instrument under the NIL is that
it be payable on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time.sS The Code adopts
the language "definite time" in lieu of "determinable future time,"81 and reverses the
position taken by section 4(3) of the NIL which states that negotiability is not destroyed
if performance is to be had on an event certain to happen though uncertain as to when.
Under the Code, an instrument is not payable at a definite time unless the time of pay-
ment can be determined from the face of the instrumnt. Thus a note payable one year
after the death of the maker, or one year after the war is over, will no longer be
negotiable. 88
A different aspect of the same problem is raised by acceleration and extension
clauses. Various types of acceleration clauses may exist,89 and all need not be herein
considered. However, those clauses which give to the holder the option to accelerate the
maturity date of the instrument have received inconsistent treatment under the NIL.
The weight of authority has sustained negotiability where the operation of the clause
depends upon the occurrence of an event bearing a close relation to the problem of col-
83 UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 1(2).
84 Capitol City State Bank v. Swift, 290 Fed. 505 (E.D. Okla. 1923); Commercial Credit Co.
v. Nissen, 49 S.D. 303, 207 N.W. 61 (1926).
85 Waterhouse v. Chovinard, 128 Me. 505, 149 AtI. 21 (1930); First Nat'l Bank v. Watson,
56 Okla. 495, 155 Pac. 1152 (1916).
86 UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 1(3).
87 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-109.
88 Under the NIL, a note to be paid at a specified time after death is held to be negotiable. Mur-
rell v. Gibbs' Adm'r, 275 Ky. 124, 120 S.W.2d 1018 (1938).
89 Road Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 169 Ark. 43, 272 S.W. 834
(1925) (accelerable by maker); McCornick & Co. v. Gem State Oil & Products Co., 38 Idaho 470,
222 Pac. 286 (1923) (accelerable by the happening of a specific event); Hollingshead v. John Stuart
& Co., 8 N.D. 35, 77 N.W. 89 (1898) (accelerable by the holder).
NOTES
Iections.90 On the other hand, a clause giving the holder the option to mature the instru-
ment when he "deems himself insecure" has been held to destroy negotiability.91 Article
three, section 3-109, settles the question by permitting all types of acceleration. The justi-
fication for this view is that since demand instruments are accelerable at the option of
either party, uncertainties as to time and amount should be equally unobjectionable
when a time instrument is involved. In fact the latter instrument, having an ultimate due
date, is least objectionable on this count. To guard against abuse of discretion by the
holder, the Code provides: 92
A term providing that one party . . . may accelerate payment or performance
or require collateral or additional collateral "at will" or "when he deems himself in-
secure" or in words of similar import shall be construed to mean that he shall have
power to do so only if he in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or per-
formance is impaired. The burden of establishing lack of good faith is on the party
against whom the power has been exercised.
Extension clauses bear a close relationship to acceleration. A note may be made
payable two years after date, with an option in the maker to pay on or before that date.
The same transaction might be handled by making the note payable one year after date,
with an option in the maker to extend the payment one year. Both should be negotiable.
On the other hand, a note which gives an option to the maker to renew it at will for an
indefinite period would clearly violate the rule as to certainty of time. Hence section 3-
109 of the Code provides that an extension to a further definite time at the option of the
maker or automatically upon a specified act or event will not make the time of payment
indefinite, In brief, the purpose of the section is to clear away uncertainties under the
NIL relating to acceleration and extension clauses and eliminate objectionable instru-
ments that do not in fact have free circulation in commerce.
In that they are requisites for negotiability, conflicts arising from these differences
are governed at common law by the same tests as related to the previously posed hypo-
thetical situations. Assume A resides in Kentucky, and because of a transaction in Ten-
nessee, makes a note with a discount rate of 2% if paid before a specified event. This
then is delivered to B in Tennessee, wherein the note states it is to be performed. B sub-
sequently transfers the note to C. When C attempts to recover he is met with a personal
defense which A has against B. Should jurisdiction over A be grounded in Tennessee,
the conflict over what state law should be applied would be controlled by Edgington v.
Edgington9 3 where effect was given to the law of the place of performance. Therefore,
the law of Tennessee would be determinative and by virtue of the rule laid down in
Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Deaver, Hair & Co.,94 the note would be declared non-
negotiable due to uncertainty of amount. Such a result does not appear to be unreason-
able. All the contacts of the note, with the exeception of the making, occurred in Ten-
nessee, and it was within that state that it was accepted by C. This leads to the reason-
able presumption that Tennessee law was contemplated by the parties as controlling,
or at least was anticipated as the controlling jurisdiction.
Would the court's determination of C's interest be different were the action brought
in Kentucky? The answer to this question is "yes" if the court finds the Code applicable,
for, as stated in section 3-106, such a discount rate does not affect negotiability. How-
ever, before the Code can be applied so as to reach this contrary decision, the court
must first find an "appropriate relation" with the state. The only relation with Ken-
tucky in our hypothetical is the fact that the note was made there. Whether the court
would find the mere making of the note to be an "appropriate relation" cannot be as-
certained with certainty. However, there appears to be little justification for such a
90 See Chafee, Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper, 32 HAnv. L. Rnv. 747 (1919).
91 First State Bank v. Barton, 129 Okla. 67, 263 Pac. 142 (1928); Puget Sound State Bank v.
Washington Paving Co., 94 Wash. 504, 162 Pac. 870 (1917).
92 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-208.
93 179 Tenn. 83, 162 S.W.2d 1082 (1942).
94 2 Tenn. Civ. App. 366, Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 1918B 603 (1911).
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holding. It seems more likely that Kentucky would not apply the Code, but rely upon
its rules of conflicts, thereby looking to the law of Tennessee. 95
Now let us add one more step to our hypothetical situation. Assume that C carries
the note into Pennsylvania whereupon he transfers it to D. From the original transac-
tion there is nothing to indicate that A or B did foresee, or even that they should have
foreseen, that the note would pass into Pennsylvania; nor that they intended the law
of Pennsylvania to apply to their transaction. D now is in a very advantageous position.
In an action, the Pennsylvania courts will not look back to the intent of the original
parties, nor will they look to the state, Tennessee, which is the most closely connected
with the transaction. Rather, simply because the instrument was transferred within its
borders, they will look to their own law, the Code, and declare the note negotiable. This
appears to be an arbitrary result which completely disregards the intent of the parties.
It is in effect a law of substitution.
Conclusion
From the foregoing, it appears that the adoption of the Code brings into life several
additional areas of conflicts. First, the states differ in interpreting some provisions of
the NIL, such as, for example, whether a payee can be a holder in due course; and
secondly, although the Code usually adopts the majority interpretation, the discretion
allowed the courts by virtue of the "appropriate relation" test may produce different re-
sults when suit is brought in a Code state from the resolution of the same problem in a
suit brought in a majority-rule jurisdiction. That there has been a lack of uniformity
in conflict of law principles in regard to commercial paper is evident. Until the Code
is adopted in all states, there is no reason to expect a greater degree of uniformity. Some
courts will continue to apply such tests as place of contracting and place of perform-
ing.96 These tests have the desirable attribute of certainty which is of prime importance
in the commercial field. Since the bulk of a lawyer's work and his greatest responsibility
in this area is to advise his client as to future conduct, this practical attribute allows
him to do so in reference to a fixed and well-settled body of law.
Other courts will apply the more modern "grouping of contacts" test which lays
emphasis upon the law of the place "which has the most significant contacts with the
matter in dispute."'97 This test may diminish the area of reasonable predictability, since
it is within the discretion of the court to determine which state has the most reasonable
contacts with the transaction. Because there are often significant contacts in many states,
the question of which particular state's law should measure the obligation seldom lends
itself to simple solution by means of mechanical formulae of the conflicts of law. Never-
theless, stressing the relevant contacts enables the forum to apply the law of the juris-
diction most intimately concerned with the outcome of the particular litigation.98 The
court is allowed to exercise ". . . informed judgment in the balancing of all the interests
of the states with the most significant contacts in order best to accommodate the equities
among the parties to the policies of those states." 99 This test also gives consideration to
the probable intention of the parties and gives the court a wider discretion, enabling it
to apply the law which upholds the transaction. 100
95 Deins' Adm'r v. Gibbs, 257 Ky. 469, 78 S.W.2d 346 (1935); Banca Italiana Di Sconto v.
Columbia Counter Co., 252 Mass. 552, 148 N.E. 105 (1925).
96 Any attempt on the part of state courts arbitrarily to use these tests to avoid an application
of the Code because it would contravene the public policy of the forum state, would be in violation
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NOTES
The "appropriate relation" test of the revised section 1-105 is applied where suit
is brought in a jurisdiction which has adopted the Code. There is no way of knowing at
this time what the courts will find to be an "appropriate relation." Any of the conflict
principles discussed in this Note perhaps may be deemed to include such a relation- In
addition there would appear to be nothing to prohibit the court from finding any of the
contacts listed in the Pennsylvania statute to be an appropriate relation. The test would
appear to lend itself to the possibility of further extension, until eventually declared un-
constitutional. In fact, an appropriate relation will likely be considered by the Code
courts to be any relation which, when used for grounding jurisdiction over the litigation,
falls short of causing the application of the Code to be unconstitutional as a violation of
full faith and credit or the contracts clause.' 0 1
State choice-of-law rules also may be subject to scrutiny by the Supreme Court if
due process questions are raised.' 02 If the "appropriate relation" as found by the court
is reasonable, and not arbitrary, it would appear to satisfy the constitutional require-
ments. In this regard, it is more difficult to reconcile section 1-105 as adopted by
Pennsylvania. Under that provision, if one of the contacts enumerated occurs within
Pennsylvania, all inter-related phases of the transaction become subject to the law of
that jurisdiction regardless of the intent of the parties.
Since the notion of "appropriate relation" is unclear, there is also the possibility
of different results in the application of section 1-105 by Code states. Because of the
fact that each state is free to determine its own standards, they may well disagree as to
when the Code, as opposed to the common law principles, should be utilized. Thus
section 1-105 is not the panacea which will eliminate the present state of confusion
found in the conflict of laws principles used in the area of commercial paper.
John F. Beggan
Alfred A. Kaelin
101 For a discussion of these clauses see Smith, Conflicts and Chaos or Contract and Uniformity:
The Uniform Commercial Code, 2 KAN. L. REv. 11, 14-32 (1953-54).
102 See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co.,. 292 U.S. 143 (1934);
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
